Abstract-The notion of a universally utility-maximizing privacy mechanism was recently introduced by Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [STOC 2009]. These are mechanisms that guarantee optimal utility to a large class of information consumers, simultaneously, while preserving Differential Privacy [Dwork, McSherry, Nissim, and Smith, TCC 2006]. Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundararajan have demonstrated, quite surprisingly, a case where such a universally-optimal differentially-private mechanisms exists, when the information consumers are Bayesian. This result was recently extended by Gupte and Sundararajan [PODS 2010] to risk-averse consumers.
I. INTRODUCTION
Differential Privacy [6] is a rigorous notion of privacy that allows learning global ('holistic') information about a collection of individuals while preserving each individual's information private. The literature of differential privacy is now rich in techniques for constructing differentially privacy mechanisms, including some generic techniques such as the addition of Laplace noise with magnitude calibrated to global sensitivity [6] , addition of instance based noise calibrated to smooth sensitivity [13] , and the exponential mechanism [12] . These techniques allow performing a wide scope of analyses in a differentially private manner, including conducting surveys over sensitive information, computing statistics, datamining, and sanitization. The reader is referred to [3] for a recent survey.
An immediate consequence of differential privacy is that (unless computing a constant function) a mechanism cannot compute a deterministic function. In other words, a differentially private version of an analysis would be a randomized approximation to the analysis, and furthermore, it would generally be possible to choose from a host of implementations for a task (e.g., the three generic construction techniques mentioned about may result with different mechanisms). Naturally, the designer of the analysis should choose one that is useful. Usefulness, however, depends on how the outcome of the analysis would be used, i.e., on the preferences of its consumer, that we henceforth refer to as information consumer. Such a trade-off between uncertainty and utility, while taking consumer's preferences into account, is the subject of rational-choice theory and decision theory, as noted in [9] , [10] .
We discuss the two models of utility which were previously discussed in [9] , [10] . In both, the information consumer has side information (her own world-view or previous knowledge), and a loss-function which quantifies the consumer's preferences and the quality of the solution for her problem. Intuitively, it describes how bad is a deviation from the exact answer for the consumer, a measure of her intolerance towards the inaccuracy imposed by differentially private mechanisms. Finally, the models assume that the consumers are rational -they combine the structure of the mechanism, their side information and their personal lossfunction (preferences) with the goal of minimizing their loss, or, equivalently maximizing their utility. The two models differ in the way side information is formulated and respectively how utility function is defined.
Information consumers' accuracy requirements vary: for some consumers only an exact answer would be of value, whereas others may aim at minimizing the estimate bias ( 1 error), or its variance ( 2 error), and, clearly, many other criteria exist. It seems that a discussion of the utility of differentially private mechanisms should take this rich variety into account. The recent work of Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [9] has put forward a serious attempt at doing exactly that with respect to (oblivious) Bayesian information consumers. In this utility model, the consumer's side information is described as an a priori distribution on the exact result of the analysis. The recent work of Gupte and Sundararajan [10] considers a related model where the information consumers are risk-averse. Here, the information consumer's knowledge is a set of possible values the exact analysis can take, and an optimal mechanism minimizes the consumer's worst-case expected loss.
Composition theorems for differential privacy only guarantee that the degradation in privacy is not more than exponential in the number invocations. Hence, while different consumers may exhibit different optimal mechanisms, a very important goal is to avoid invoking that multiplicity of mechanisms. This degradation is part of the motivation for the work on sanitization where a family of queries are answered at once [5] , [1] , [8] , [7] , the work on privacy under continual observation [4] , and the construction of the Median Mechanism [14] . A surprising result of Ghosh, Roughdarden, and Sundararajan [9] is that invoking a multiplicity of optimal mechanisms may not be necessary. They consider a database that is a collection of Binary inputs (e.g., pertaining to having some disease) and Bayesian information consumers that wish to count the number of one entries in the database (equivalently, compute the sum of the entries). They show the existence of a single mechanism that enables optimality for all Bayesian information consumers (the mechanism needs to be invoked only once). The mechanism itself is not optimal for all Bayesian information consumers, however, each consumer can perform a deterministic remapping on the outcome of the common mechanism, where the remapping is chosen according to her notion of utility, and locally output a result that is effectively according to one of her optimal mechanism. Such a common mechanism is referred to as universally optimal. An analogous result for risk-averse information consumers was shown in [10] .
Are these results of [9] and [10] that deal with the simple case of a single count query "accidental", or can they be extended to other queries? to multiple queries? One would anticipate that universally-optimal mechanisms should exist (at least) for those queries that are closely related to counting, such as sum queries where the inputs are non-binary, histograms, and bundles of two or more count queries.
A. Our Results and Directions for Future Progress
In contrast with the anticipation expressed in the previous paragraph, we show that settings in which universally optimal mechanisms exist are extremely rare, and, in particular, in both the setting of Bayesian and of risk-averse information consumers, universally optimal mechanisms do not exist even for sum queries where the inputs are non-binary, histograms, and bundles of two or more count queries.
Moreover, in the case of Bayesian information consumers, we give a characterization of those functions of the data that admit universally optimal mechanisms. The characterization makes use of a combinatorial structure of the query function f : D n → R f , where D is the domain of the database records and R f is the output space of the query function. We define this combinatorial structure of the query G f and call it a privacy constraint graph. The vertices of G f correspond to values in R f , and edges correspond to pairs of values resulting by applying f to neighboring databases. (This graph was examined in some proofs in [11] as well). We show: Theorem 14 (Informal). If G f contains a cycle then no universally optimal mechanism exists for f .
Theorem 15 (Informal). If G f is a tree that contains a vertex of degree 3 or more, then no universally optimal mechanism exists for f for better values of the privacy parameter.
Facing the impossibility of universal optimality, an alternative may be found in an approximate notion, which enables (approximate) optimality to (approximately) all of the information consumers. A good notion of approximate optimality should allow constructing such mechanisms for sum queries, histograms, and more. Furthermore, it should allow performing several queries and satisfy a composition requirement, in a sense that when applying two such mechanisms to two different queries, the resulting composed mechanism should be somewhat approximately optimal for the two queries together.
Finally, we note that, following prior work we focus on oblivious mechanisms (see Section II-B for the technical definition). In Section III, we show that for the intuitive generalizations of count queries, enabling non-oblivious universal mechanisms from which optimal oblivious mechanisms are derived, still leaves the construction of universally optimal mechanisms impossible. The question whether nonoblivious universally-optimal mechanisms exist for some other natural abstract queries, from which all oblivious universally-optimal mechanisms may be derived is left open.
B. Related Work
Most relevant to our work are the papers by Ghosh, Roughgarden, and Sundararajan [9] and by Gupte and Sundararajan [10] . Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundararajan show that the geometric mechanism (a discrete version of the Laplace mechanism of [6] ) yields optimal utility for all Bayesian information consumers for a count query. Their proof begins by observing that all differentially private mechanisms correspond to the feasible region of a Linear Program (a polytope), and that minimizing disutility can be expressed as minimizing a linear functional. Hence, every Bayesian information consumer has an optimal mechanism corresponding to a vertex of the polytope, which in turn corresponds to a subset of the constraints of the Linear Program which are tight (optimal mechanisms, not corresponding to the polytope vertices, may also exist). They introduce a constraint matrix that uniquely corresponds to a vertex of the polytope, and indicates which constraints are tight, and which are slack on that vertex. Those constraint matrices that correspond to optimal mechanisms, are shown to have some special structure that allows to derive mechanisms with the same signature (and thus equal) from the geometric mechanism using some deterministic remapping on its output.
We are also interested in observing the tight constraints in some mechanisms. We will not need the full description of the structure of such a constraint matrix. Instead we only use the observation that tight privacy constraints can be derived only from mechanisms that also obey similar tight constraints.
Gupte and Sundararajan show similar results for the riskaverse utility model, where consumers try to minimizes their maximal worst-case disutility. They provide a full characterization of the mechanisms which are derivable (by random remapping) from the geometric mechanism and use this characterization to construct a universally-optimal mechanism for a count query. An interesting feature of the construction is that it releases noisy answers of the query at different privacy levels, thus keeping more privacy against specific consumers, and enabling more utility to others.
Also related to our work is the recent work of Kifer and Lin [11] that studies privacy and utility, in a very general setting, from an axiomatic point of view. They introduce a partial order on mechanism where mechanism Y is at least as general as mechanism X if X can be derived from Y by post processing. They also introduce the concept of maximal generality, which turns to be useful in our proofs.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Differential Privacy [6] Consider databases D 1 , D 2 ∈ D n which consist of n records out of some domain D. The Hamming Distance between D 1 and D 2 is the number of records on which they differ. We will call databases at distance one neighboring.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [6] ). Let M : D n → R be a probabilistic mechanism. M preserves α-differentialprivacy for α ∈ (0, 1) if for any two neighboring databases
n and any (measurable) subset of the mechanism's range S ⊆ R,
The probability is taken over the coin tosses of the mechanism M.
Notice that the greater α is the less the mechanism's output depends on the exact query result, and so better privacy is attained.
B. Oblivious Mechanisms
We consider a setting where several information consumers are interested in estimating the value of some query f (·) applied to a database D ∈ D n , and answered by a differentially private mechanism M. Reference [9] shows that if no restriction is put on the mechanism, then no universally optimal mechanism exists for count queries (intuitively, universal optimality, defined below, means that all potential consumers minimize their loss simultaneously). On the other hand, universally optimal mechanisms sometimes do exist if we restrict our mechanisms such that their output distribution depends only on the the exact query result (a.k.a. oblivious mechanisms). This is why in [9] (and later in [10] ) only oblivious mechanisms are considered 1 . We follow suit and only consider oblivious mechanisms. We show in Subsection III-B that this restriction does not weaken the basic results presented in Section III.
Combining α-differential privacy with obliviousness, we get that for every i, i ∈ R f which are outputs of neighbor-
Oblivious Differentially Private Mechanisms for a Count Query: An oblivious finite-range mechanism M : D n → R estimating f : D n → R f can be described by a row-stochastic matrix X = (x i,j ) of the underlying randomized mappingM, whose rows are indexed by elements of R f , and whose columns are indexed by elements of R, where x i,j equals the probability of outputting j ∈ R when f (D) = i. Since R is finite, and information consumers anyway remap the outcome of M, we can assume, wlog, that R = {0, 1, 2, . . . , |R| − 1}.
We now consider the case where D = {0, 1} and f (D) counts the number of one entries in D. Hence, R f = {0, . . . , n} and the matrix X is of dimensions (n + 1) × |R|. Preserving α-differential privacy poses constraints on the transition matrix X beyond row-stochasticity. Note that for the count query, the query results of two neighboring databases may differ by at most one. Differential privacy hence imposes the constrains x i,j ≥ α · x i+1,j and x i+1,j ≥ α · x i,j where i ∈ R f = {0 . . . n − 1} and j ∈ R. Adding row-stochasticity and differential privacy, we get that an oblivious differentially private mechanism for the count query should satisfy the following linear constraints:
C. Utility Models
We use the utility models defined in [9] and [10] . In both, a loss function (i, r) quantifies an information consumer's disutility when she chooses to use answer r while the correct answer is i. Given a loss function (·, ·) of an information consumer, if the exact answer is i then her expected loss is
2 Loss functions vary between consumers, and the only assumptions made in [9] , [10] is that (i, r) depends on i and |i−r| and is monotonically non-decreasing in |i − r| for all i. (This is a reasonable requirement that turns to be crucial for the existence of a universally optimal mechanism [9] .) Examples of loss functions include 1 (i, r) = |i−r| (consumers who care to minimize expected mean error); 2 (i, r) = (i − r)
2 (minimize error variance); and bin (i, r) that evaluates to 0 if i = r and to 1 otherwise (minimize number of errors).
Information consumers differ in their knowledge about the exact f (D). References [9] and [10] model this knowledge differently as we now describe.
Bayesian Model [9] : In the Bayesian utility model, an information consumer's knowledge is represented by a vectorp where p i is the consumer's a priori probability that f (D) = i. Having a vector of prior probabilitiesp and loss function (·, ·), the consumer's expected loss can be expressed as i p i · r x i,r · (i, r). The optimal mechanisms for this information consumer hence are the solutions of the linear program in the variables x i,r consisting the constraints in (2)-(5) and the objective minimize i∈R f
Risk-Averse Model [10] : In the risk-averse utility model an information consumer's knowledge restricts the possible values for the exact f (D). This is expressed by a set S ⊆ R f of the possible values f (D) can take. The consumer is interested in minimizing her maximal expected loss conditioned on f (D) ∈ S, i.e., max i∈S r x i,r · (i, r). Similarly to the above, the optimal mechanism for an information consumer is a solution to a linear program consisting the constraints in (2)-(5) and the objective minimize max i∈S r∈R
D. Remapping and Generality
An information consumer might have access to a private mechanism U which is not tailored specifically for her needs (i.e., to her prior knowledge and loss function). Yet, she may be able to recover a better mechanism for her needs by means of post-processing, which we will denote remapping. To intuit remapping, consider a consumer that knows that for the specific database the count query cannot yield the answer 0. If that consumer receives a 0, it may be beneficial for her to remap it to 1. (Recall that the loss function is monotone in |i − r|.) Denoting the given mechanism by U and the remapping by T (a row-stochastic linear transformation, T has no access to the information of the database other then the output of U ), the actual mechanism that is used by the information consumer is T • U (in matrix form: U T ).
Notice that given a mechanism U with a finite range, an information consumer can find the optimal remapping T for her (such that T • U has optimal utility), by constructing a linear program in which T = (t i,j ) are the program variables [10] .
Definition 3 (Derivable Mechanisms, Generality Partial Order [11] ). Let X, Y be private mechanisms. We say that a mechanism X is derivable from a mechanism Y if there exists a random remapping T of the results of mechanism Y , such that X = T • Y . We also say that Y is at least as general as X, and denote this relation by
Definition 4 (Maximal Generality [11] ). Let X be an α-differentially private mechanism. X is maximally general if for every α-differentially private mechanism Y , if
After introducing the notion of maximally general mechanisms (for any definition of privacy), Kifer and Lin fully characterize all maximally general private mechanisms with a finite input space in the differential privacy setting. First they introduce the concept of column-graphs 3 of a private mechanism, which mark the tight privacy constraints in one column of the mechanism X. Definition 5 (Column graph [11] ). Let X be an α-differentially private mechanism with a finite input space. Let r be some possible output of X, and x r be its corresponding column in X. Let I be the input space of X (corresponding to X's rows). The graph associated with this column has I as the set of nodes, and for any i 1 , i 2 ∈ I, there is a directed edge (i 1 , i 2 ) if i 1 and i 2 match neighboring databases and x i1,r = αx i2,r , and a directed edge (i 2 , i 1 ) if x i2,r = αx i1,r . The direction of the edges is only necessary to distinguish between maximally general mechanisms which have similar undirected column-graphs, but it will not be essential to the rest of this article.
Kifer and Lin characterize the maximally general differ-entially private mechanisms with a finite input space:
. Fix a privacy parameter α and a database query f with a finite range for databases of a specific size. Let X be an α-differentially private mechanism with a finite range. Then X is maximally general iff each column graph of X's columns (according to the privacy constraints implied by f ) is connected.
This theorem shows that we wish to maximize the set of tight privacy constraints in order to make a private mechanism as general as possible. Notice that having just one entry of a column in X and the spanning tree of this column's graph (we need to know the direction of the edges as well), determines all the entries of this column.
E. Universal Mechanisms
Consider a collection of Bayesian information consumers, and suppose we wish to enable each of the information consumers to sample a result from a differentially private mechanism optimizing her utility. In [9] , Ghosh, Roughgarden and Sundararajan showed that this does not necessarily require executing multiple mechanisms: if the query is a count query, then it is possible to construct one universally optimal mechanism U , from which all information consumers can simultaneously recover an optimal mechanism for their needs by remapping. I.e., every information consumer has an optimal private mechanism which is derivable from U . This result is repeated for risk-averse information consumers by Gupte and Sundararajan in [10] . More formally:
Theorem 7 (Universal optimality, Bayesian consumers [9] ). Fix a privacy parameter α ∈ (0, 1). There exists an α-differentially private mechanism U for a single count query, such that for every priorp and every monotone loss function (·, ·) there exists a (deterministic) remapping T such that T • U implements an optimal oblivious mechanism for p, (·, ·).
Theorem 8 (Universal optimality, risk-averse consumers [10] ). Fix a privacy parameter α ∈ (0, 1). There exists an α-differentially private mechanism U for a single count query, such that for every set S of possible outcomes and every monotone loss function (·, ·) there exists a (probabilistic) remapping T such that T • U implements an optimal oblivious mechanism for S, (·, ·).
In both theorems U is realized by the geometric mechanism (a variant of adding Laplace noise of [6] ). It is shown that for every information consumer there is at least one private mechanism that is derivable from the geometric mechanism and is optimal for her.
III. IMPOSSIBILITY OF UNIVERSALLY OPTIMAL MECHANISMS FOR GENERALIZATIONS OF COUNT
When the domain of the database records is {0, 1}, a count query is equivalent to a sum query. Theorems 7 and 8 can hence be thought of as applying to a sum query over the integers, where the domain of the database is Binary. It is natural to ask whether the results of these theorems can be extended to showing that universally optimal mechanisms exist for sum queries when the underlying data is taken from a larger domain such as D = {0, 1, . . . , m} where m ≥ 2. We answer this question negatively.
Consider the case m = 2. Recall that an oblivious differentially private mechanism can be described by a row-stochastic matrix X = (x i,j ), such that x i,j is the probability of the mechanism to return j when the exact result is i.
Once again, a consumer's optimal mechanism can be found by solving a linear program with all the constraints and the appropriate target function.
A. The Basic Impossibility Result for Sum Queries
We first consider the case where the database contains n = 1 record, taking values in {0,1,2} (i.e., m = 2). Later, we generalize to n ≥ 1 and m ≥ 2. Note that in the case of n = 1, the non-oblivious mechanisms are identical to oblivious mechanisms. We consider non-oblivious universal mechanisms as well when generalizing this result lo larger values of n. Observation 9. In the Bayesian model there exists an information consumer whose only optimal mechanism is X = Proof: Consider an information consumer with a prior p = ( ) and a loss function bin (i.e., a penalty of 1 whenever she chooses an answer different from the exact result, and no penalty otherwise). It is easy to see that no optimal mechanism for this consumer outputs a value not in {0, 1, 2}.
The information consumer wishes to minimize
And so, the consumer's goal is to maximize 2 i=0 x i,i subject to maintaining α-differential privacy.
For i ∈ {0, 1, 2}, having α-differential privacy implies
and hence (by summing up (8) for j = i), we get
Summing up (9) for i ∈ {0, 1, 2} we get
x i,i , and we can now conclude that
. This inequality is tight iff (8) is tight (i.e., x j,i = αx i,i ) for every i = j. In that case, we get the following system of linear equations:
Since the three equations are linearly independent, we get a unique solution:
. A similar proof shows that mechanisms of the form Y are the only mechanisms optimal for information consumers with a prior p 0 = p 1 = 1 2 , p 2 = 0 and loss function bin . It may seem like we restrict ourselves only to information consumers with the bin loss function. Note that, according to Theorem 6, there are not so many maximally general mechanisms whose range is a subset of {0, 1, 2}, and some of them are not optimal for any consumer. Therefore, the mechanisms described are also the only optimal mechanisms for a variety of other information consumers, such as whose prior is p 0 = p 1 = 1 2 , p 2 = 0 and loss function is 1 . Also, even more such consumers can be found easily in any sequence of consumers which converge to consumers with such unique optimal mechanisms (i.e., their priors and loss functions converge to the prior and loss function of the consumer we chose). Such information consumers with close priors and close loss functions to the ones described above will have the same unique optimal mechanisms. Observation 10. In the risk-averse model there exists an information consumer whose only optimal mechanism is X = Proof: Consider an information consumer whose loss function is bin who knows the support of the query is S = {0, 1, 2}. As in the previous observation, the support of any optimal mechanism for this consumer must be a subset of {0, 1, 2}. Notice that if the consumer uses the mechanism described by X then her maximal expected loss is 2α 1+2α . Assume for a contradiction that the consumer has another mechanism X with maximal expected loss at most 2α 1+2α . I.e., max{x 0,1 +x 0,2 , x 1,0 +x 1,2 , x 2,0 +x 2,1 } ≤ 2α (1 + 2α)
.
Since X = X, (10) implies that x i,j < α 1+2α for some i = j. Taking into account that X is α-differentially private we get
, and hence the maximal expected loss is at least i =j
, in contradiction to the assumption that this mechanism is at least as good as X for this information consumer.
A similar proof shows that mechanisms of the form Y are the only mechanisms optimal for an information consumer with auxiliary knowledge of the support S = {0, 1} and loss function bin . As in the previous observation, the mechanisms described are also the only optimal mechanisms for a variety of other information consumers.
We will now use these two observations to show that in both models no universally optimal mechanism U exists. (This is true even if we allow U to have a non-discrete range.) Claim 11. No α-differentially private mechanism can derive both X and an instance of Y .
Proof: Assume for a contradiction that such a mechanism U exists, so X and some instance of Y are both derivable from U . For simplicity we refer to this instance as Y . By Theorem 6, X is a maximally general mechanism. Therefore U G X, and hence Y G X, i.e., there exists a random remapping T such that Y = XT . Denote by x j the j th column of X, and by y k the k th column of Y . We get that y k = t 0,k ·x 0 +t 1,k ·x 1 +t 2,k ·x 2 for k ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Note that some α-differentially privacy constraints in Y are tight. Specifically, y 1,0 = αy 0,0 and y 0,1 = αy 1,1 . As Y 's columns are non-negative linear combinations of X's columns, such a tight constraint in a column of Y appears only if this column is a linear combination of columns of X in which the same privacy constraints are also tight. Note that the first two entries of every column in Y correspond to a tight constraint. But since x 0,2 = x 1,2 > 0, mapping this column of X by T to any column of Y (even with just a positive probability), yields a mechanism with a column in which the first two entries do not correspond to a tight constraint. Therefore, a contradiction.
B. Generalizing the Basic Result for Other Queries
Next, we generalize the basic impossibility result to the more general case of sum queries where m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1. Another natural generalization of count queries is to histogram queries which partition the database records into three categories or more. Finally we consider the generalization of single count queries to a bundle of count queries, where a bundle contains several simple (non-trivial) count queries that need to be answered simultaneously. Note that a consumer's disutility for a bundle query need not be the sum of the losses for the separate basic queries -it may be a more involved function of the bundle outputs. Furthermore, information consumers may have auxiliary knowledge about the dependency between bundle outputs.
Theorem 12.
No universally optimal mechanism exists for sum queries for databases whose records take values in the set {0, 1, . . . , m} where m ≥ 2. No universally optimal mechanism exists for histogram queries, except for histograms for one predicate and its complement or trivial predicates. No universally optimal mechanism exists for bundles of more than one simultaneous non-trivial count queries. These results hold both for the Bayesian and the risk-averse utility models.
All the generalization queries which were mentioned in the theorem have a common feature which distinguishes them from count queries. In all the suggested queries there are 3 (or more) query outputs which are the results of 3 neighboring databases. This fact enables us to reduce this problem to the basic case of the previous subsection. The proof is omitted and will appear in the full version of this article. We note that this statement holds even if we allow non-oblivious universal mechanisms.
IV. A CHARACTERIZATION OF UNIVERSAL OPTIMALITY
IN THE BAYESIAN SETTING We now discuss a more general setting, where a query (not necessarily related to sum or count) is answered by a differentially private mechanism in the Bayesian utility model. We follow other works on this subject and only consider oblivious private mechanisms. Note that although our results do not exclude the possibility of non-oblivious differentially private mechanisms, our techniques yield that no such non-oblivious universally optimal mechanisms exist for many natural functions. Specifically, enabling universal non-oblivious mechanisms cannot resolve such impossibilities for a query whenever there are 3 (or more) values which are the exact query results of 3 different neighboring databases. This is due to the same argument that was used in Subsection III-B.
Let the database records be taken from a discrete domain D and let the query be f : D n → R f (wlog, we will assume that f is a surjective function, in which case
n } is also a discrete set). Define the following graph where edges correspond to answers f may give on neighboring databases (and hence to restrictions on output distributions implied by differential privacy):
Definition 13 (Privacy Constraint Graph). Fix a query f : D n → R f . The Privacy Constraint Graph for f is the undirected graph G f = (V, E) where V = R f is the set of all possible query results and
The degree of the constraint graph, ∆(G f ), is the maximum over its vertices' degrees.
Recall that the results of [9] , [10] are restricted to loss functions (i, r) that are monotonically non-decreasing in the metric |i − r|. In our more general setting, we avoid interpreting outcome of f as points of a specific metric space, and hence we only consider the bin loss function, which would remain monotone under any imposed metric.
Outline of this Section.: We are now ready to describe the results of this section. Let f be a query, and G f its constraint graph. We first show that if G f is a single cycle, then no universally optimal mechanism exists for f . This impossibility result is then extended to the case where G f contains a cycle. Theorem 14. Fix a query f : D n → R f , and let G f be its constraint graph. Consider Bayesian information consumers with loss function bin . If G f contains a cycle then no universally optimal mechanism exists for these consumers.
Constraint graphs of sum queries (for m ≥ 2), histograms and bundles of queries all have cycles of length 3, so, in the Bayesian utility model, Theorem 14 generalizes all our previous results.
Next, we consider the case where G f is a tree and show that if G f contains a vertex of degree 3 or higher, then no α-differentially private universally optimal mechanism exists for f for α > 1/(∆(G f ) − 1). (Recall that the closer α is to one, the better privacy we get.)
Theorem 15. Fix a query f : D n → R f , and let G f be its constraint graph. Consider Bayesian information consumers with loss function bin . If the privacy parameter α > 1/(∆(G f ) − 1) then no universally optimal mechanism exists for these consumers.
We can conclude from theorems 14 and 15 that for α > 0.5, the only functions f for which universally optimal mechanisms exist are those where G f is a simple chain, as is the case for the count query.
The proof structure is similar to the one presented in the previous section for sum queries. We begin with the case where G f is a simple cycle. We consider two consumers with different priors and loss function bin , and show that the optimal mechanisms for these consumers must have specific structures (in the sense that some privacy constraints are satisfied tightly). Once again, we show that for two mechanisms with such structures, there is no mechanism which is at least as general as these two (i.e., there is no single mechanism which derives both of them).
Next, we extend the proof to the case where G f contains a cycle. We focus on a cycle in G f of smallest size m, and consider two information consumers. The consumers are similar to those for the case where G f is a cycle, and so are the optimal mechanisms for them, except that we need to prove that these optimal mechanisms can be extended in a differentially private manner to the entire range of f . For that we introduce a labeling of G f in which the labels of adjacent vertices differ by at most one modulo m.
Last, we discuss the case where G f is a tree containing a vertex of degree at least 3. Focusing on that vertex and three of its adjacent vertices, we present three consumers with different priors. Again, we focus on the corresponding entries in the matrices of their optimal mechanisms, and find which constraints must be tight. Assuming all three mechanisms are derived from a single mechanism U , we present three different partitions of U 's range according to which constraints are tight for every measurable subset of U 's range. Combining the attributes from these partitions, we get one elaborated partition of U 's range. We can then assume U 's range is finite and reveal the structure of its matrix columns. Such a structure of U 's columns (for the consumers we chose) is feasible iff we compromise for a privacy parameter α ≤ 0.5. Finally, we generalize this claim to any degree of one vertex.
A. The Basic Case: G f is a Cycle
We begin with the simple case where G f is a single cycle of m > 2 vertices 4 .
Claim 16. If the constraint graph G f of f : D n → R f is a single cycle, then no universally optimal mechanism for Bayesian information consumers exists for f .
We already proved impossibility of universal optimality for the case m = 3 in Claim 11. We now deal with the case m > 3. As in the proof of Claim 11, we will present two information consumers, and their corresponding optimal mechanisms, and prove that these cannot be derived from a single mechanism.
We first consider an information consumer with loss function bin and prior p v0 = p v1 = · · · = p vm−1 = 1/m, and construct the unique optimal mechanism X for this consumer. (X is represented by an m × m matrix since with the bin loss function the support of the optimal mechanism's range must match the support of the consumer's prior.) An the columns may be multiplied by a different coefficient). By forcing row stochasticity, we can solve the following equations to get the coefficients:
and we get a unique structure on the entries of these rows and columns of Y . This mechanism is of no surprise, as these entries are merely the finite-range version of the geometric mechanism (as shown in [9] ). Summarizing our findings, we get that
We now show that instances of such mechanisms X and Y are not derivable from a single mechanism. Since the conditions stated for these mechanisms are necessary for them to be optimal for the two consumers we chose, this will prove that there is no universally optimal mechanism in such a scenario.
Suppose, towards a contradiction, that there exists a mechanism U which derives both X and some instance of Y . According to the characterization of generally maximal differentially private mechanisms (Theorem 6), X is maximally general. Therefore, we get that U is derivable from X and so Y is derivable from X as well. Therefore, there exists a remapping matrix T such that Y = XT . Remember that Y 's columns are linear combinations of X's columns with non-negative coefficients, as described in the proof of Claim 11. Any tight constraint met in one of Y 's columns must match the same tight constraints in all of X's columns which appear in the linear combination of that column. Once again, any specific column of X must appear in at least one linear combination of one of Y 's columns with a positive coefficient (as any possible output of X must be remapped to the values
T . Mapping this column into any of Y 's first three columns (with any positive probability) cannot yield the tight constraints which appear in the first three entries of the chosen column in Y . Therefore, no such remapping T is feasible and we get a contradiction.
B. Impossibility of Universal Optimality When G f Contains a Cycle
We now give a proof for Theorem 14 which deals with the case where G f contains a cycle.
Proof: Let C m = (v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v m−1 , v 0 ) be a cycle of smallest size in G f . Based on C m , we will consider two consumers whose optimal mechanisms contain as submatrices the matrices X, Y from the proof of Claim 16, and hence they cannot be derived from a single mechanism.
The First Consumer: uniform prior over C m : Consider an information consumer with loss function bin and prior p v0 = p v1 = · · · = p vm−1 = 1/m and p u = 0 for every u / ∈ C m . We will construct an optimal mechanism X for this consumer, and will prove that (in some sense) it is unique. We begin with a labeling algorithm of the vertices in G:
a) Let V s be the set of unlabeled vertices that are adjacent to vertices labeled s − 1.
Claim 17. After applying the algorithm, the labels for every two adjacent vertices differ by at most 1 (modulo m).
Proof:
We show that at any stage of the labeling, any two adjacent vertices satisfy the requirement that their labels differ by at most 1 (modulo m).
Note first that this holds for all labeled vertices after Step 1. Consider a vertex u ∈ V s (i.e., l(u) = s is set in iteration s), and an adjacent vertex u that is labeled l(u ) = s prior to or on iteration s. Clearly, if u ∈ V s ∪V s−1 then s ∈ {s − 1, s} and the statement holds for (u, u ). Otherwise, we consider two sub-cases. In the first, l(u ) = s < s − 1, and we are led to a contradiction since u remains unlabeled after iteration s +1 whereas by definition u ∈ V s +1 . In the second sub-case l(u ) = s > s + 1 (if s = s + 1 the claim holds) and hence it must have been that u was labeled in Step 1, i.e., u = v s for s ∈ {s + 1, . . . , m − 1}. Following the path of labels which led to the label of u we can get to the vertex v 0 via a path of length s. Noting that this path is disjoint from the length m − s path v s v 0 = v s , v s +1 , . . . , v m−1 , v 0 , we get that G contains the cycle v s v 0 u u that is of length m − s + s + 1 < m, in contradiction to C m being the smallest cycle in G. To conclude the proof, note that every vertex u ∈ G adjacent to some u ∈ G such that l(u ) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , m − 2} has been labeled in iteration l(u ) + 1 or earlier. Therefore in Step 3, the vertices which are not labeled yet are adjacent only to unlabeled vertices and to vertices with label m − 1. Labeling the remaining vertices with m − 1 satisfies the requirement.
We now use the graph labels to construct an optimal mechanism X , represented by a matrix of dimensions |R f | × |R f |. The entries of rows u / ∈ C m have no effect on the expected loss of this consumer, as p u = 0. There are, however, restrictions on these rows, as the mechanism X must be differentially private. We construct X as follows: 1) For all u / ∈ C m , set column u of X to be a column of zeros. 2) For all u ∈ C m , set row u of X as in the optimal mechanism X described in the proof of Claim 16 (i.e., as seen in (13)). 3) For all u / ∈ C m , set row u of X to be identical to the row corresponding with the vertex identically labeled in C m .
Clearly, the resulting mechanism is row-stochastic. The privacy constraints also hold: suppose u, u ∈ R f are query results of neighboring databases. Therefore, they are adjacent in the constraint graph, and their labels differ by at most 1 (modulo m). And so, their matching rows in mechanism X are either identical or they are the same as rows of two adjacent vertices v i , v j ∈ C m in mechanism X. Since the construction of rows in X hold to the privacy constraints, so do the rows of X . In other words, we just showed that mechanism X can be extended to any query f whose constraint graph G f contains C m but no smaller cycles.
Notice that only rows of C m affect the expected loss in X , which is hence identical to that of X. Since any mechanism in this scenario has to satisfy all the restrictions for just the vertices of the cycle C m , and more, the expected loss for any optimal mechanism in the current scenario is lower bounded with that of X. Hence, we can conclude that X is optimal for the information consumer, and furthermore, X restricted to the rows corresponding to C m is unique.
The Second Consumer: uniform prior over v 0 , v 1 , v 2 : Consider an information consumer with loss function bin and prior p v0 = p v1 = p v2 = 1/3 and p u = 0 for every other u ∈ R f . We argue that every optimal mechanism Y for this consumer has the same structure on rows v 0 , v 1 , v 2 as mechanism Y in (13) . As the impossibility of universal optimality for the case of m = 3 was already covered, and we assumed m > 3, v 0 and v 2 are not adjacent in G f . This enables us to label the vertices in such a way: l(v 0 ) = 0, l(v 2 ) = 2 and l(u) = 1 for any other vertex in G f . Again, it is clear that every two adjacent vertices have labels which differ by 1 at most. Similar arguments as the ones presented for the first consumer, show that the first three rows of every optimal mechanism for this consumer (i.e. the rows for v 0 , v 1 , v 2 ) have the same structure as the first three rows of mechanism Y in (13) .
Assume towards a contradiction that both X and Y are derivable from a single mechanism U . Therefore there exist remappings T, S such that X = U T and Y = U S. Let U be the mechanism U reduced to only the inputs of the cycle C m = {v 0 , v 1 , . . . , v m−1 }. Reducing U to U , we get that X = U T and Y = U S. According to the previous subsection these two mechanisms cannot be derived from a single oblivious mechanism, due to the same arguments in the proof of Claim 11. Thus, we get a contradiction.
C. Impossibility of Universal Optimality When
Finally we focus on acyclic constraint graphs and consider Theorem 15 and its conclusion that for α > 0.5 no universally optimal mechanisms exists unless the constraint graph is a simple chain. The proof is omitted and will appear in the full version of this article.
